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ORIGINAL PAPER

A Change of Heart? Why Individual-Level Public Opinion Shifted Against Trump's "Muslim Ban"

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Abstract Public opinion research suggests that rapid and significant individual-level fluctuations in opinions toward various policies is fairly unexpected absent methodological artifacts. While this may generally be the case, some political actions can and do face tremendous backlash, potentially impacting public evaluations. Leveraging broadcast and newspaper transcripts as well as a unique two-wave panel study we demonstrate that a non-random, rapid shift in opinions occurred shortly after President Donald Trump signed executive order 13769 into law, which barred individuals from seven predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United States for 90 days. The ban set off a fury of protests across U.S. cities and airports, garnering tremendous media attention and discussion. Drawing insights from literature on priming, we claim that an influx of new information portraying the "Muslim Ban" at odds with inclusive elements of American identity

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prompted some citizens to shift their attitudes. Our study highlights the potential broad political effects of mass movements and protests as it pertains to policies that impact racialized minority groups, and suggests that preferences can shift quickly in response to changing political circumstances.

Keywords Race and ethnic politics · Religion and politics · Public opinion · Panel data · Muslim Americans · American identity · Protests and demonstrations

> "I am opposed to banning refugees from our country and seeing the protests and hearing the stories following this un-American travel ban has only strengthened my feelings against this administration." – Survey Respondent

On Friday, January 27th, 2017 President Donald Trump, shortly after his inauguration, signed executive order 13769, the "Protection Of The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States," into law. The order made changes to immigration policies and procedures and banned individuals from seven predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United States for 90 days.

The ban set off a fury of protests across U.S. cities and airports. Tens of thousands of Americans from coast to coast chanted slogans such as "No hate, no fear, refugees are welcome here." In addition, the detention of U.S. visa holders and legal residents created confusion and despair, receiving much media attention and discussion on various social media platforms. While the ban raises several important constitutional questions that are making their way through the nation's courts, two public opinion questions remain: (1) Did the ensuing controversy about the travel ban shift individual-level support for the ban in a relatively short time period? And if so, (2) amongst whom and why?

Cross-sectional data from Quinnipiac University suggests that public opinion moved swiftly against the ban after President Trump signed the executive order. In a poll released on January 12th, 2017—several weeks before the executive order announcement—the travel ban received near majority support: 48–42%. But by February 7th, support for the ban had dropped to 44% and opposition had grown to 50%.[1] Causal claims about opinion shifts, however, cannot be appropriately identified with existing publicly available data, given that these data are cross-sections in time and suffer from internal validity (i.e., the respondents differ between the two surveys).

Anticipating the executive order announcement and the ensuing controversy, we fielded a two-wave (pre-ban/post-ban) panel study on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). This approach allows us to examine individual-level change with strong internal validity because panel studies interview the same subjects before and after an event or issue has become salient. We are therefore able to make more reliable claims about who shifted towards and against the ban and why.

[1] https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2017/02/07/a-new-poll-shows-a-surprisingly-big-public-swing-against-trumps-muslim-ban/?utm_term=.ba8a426ac235.

Given this advantageous design, we can offer at least two key contributions to existing literature on political attitudes. First, counter to expectations that most policy preferences are highly resilient to change, especially in a short time span (Bishin et al. 2016; Page and Shapiro 1982), we demonstrate that non-random, rapid shifts in attitudes did occur in the case of the "Muslim Ban" as a result of bringing new considerations to bear for individuals (Fiske and Taylor 2013; Zaller 1992). Second, we argue that this change was partly driven by an influx of information portraying the ban as being at odds with egalitarian principles of American identity and notions of religious liberty (Citrin et al. 1990; Feldman 1988).

Consistent with prior scholarship, we define American identity as a subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the nation. National identity is a construct that emphasizes the importance of one's nationality in defining one's identity and the very basic idea that one can belong to a national 'us' (Gustavsson 2017). American identity is thus related to a sense of being or feeling American (Citrin et al. 2001; Huddy 2001; Huddy 2015; Huddy and Khatib 2007). Importantly, American national identity differs from concepts such as ethnocentrism, chauvinism or patriotism. While ethnocentrism involves a deep-seated psychological predisposition that divides the world into in-groups and out-groups (Kinder and Kam 2010), American national identity can be unifying because it encompasses all those who are drawn to its symbols. Unlike patriotism, American identity is not tinged with political ideology (Huddy and Khatib 2007), and in contrast to chauvinism, American identity does not hold that the nation should dominate others because it is internationally superior (Gustavsson 2017). At a basic normative level, national identity refers to feelings of closeness or pride in one's country and its symbols (Ashmore et al. 2001). The ubiquity of American national identity was particularly evident in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks with abundant displays of American flags and "United We Stand" bumper stickers (Transue 2007).

While American identity is distinct from concepts such as ethnocentrism, research has typically found that American identity is linked to restrictive policy preferences toward ethnic, racial or cultural minorities (Citrin et al. 1990; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Frendreis and Tatalovich 1997; Huddy and Sears 1995; Schildkraut 2003). However, drawing from Tesler's (2015) theory that political communication can prime citizens' underlying predispositions and change policy positions on less crystalized attitudes (see also Iyengar and Kinder (1987); Krosnick and Kinder (1990)) we offer one instance in which the priming of American identity shifted citizens' opinions toward more *inclusive*, rather than restrictive, immigration-related policy stances, and show that this shift occurred rapidly once the issue became salient and was depicted as "un-American." To our knowledge, this finding is unique and presents a more optimistic account of how mass movements can potentially alter opinions toward policies that impact racialized minority groups.

In the pages that follow we examine broadcast transcripts and newspaper stories to not only illustrate that the information environment changed quickly and moved against the travel ban, but also that this shifting information environment largely depicted the ban at odds with American values. Then, drawing from research on priming, we hypothesize that the influx of new information highlighting the incompatibilities of the ban with notions of Americanism motivated high American identifiers in our panel study to reconsider their preexisting ban attitudes. We suggest that the priming of inclusive elements of American identity, as a result of the peaceful protests and ensuing media attention and criticism of the ban, played an important role in explaining the observed change in attitudes between T1 (pre-ban) and T2 (post-ban). Additional analysis also illustrates that this opinion shift was not reflective of a general movement against other policies taken or advocated by Donald Trump during the same time-frame. Unlike the travel ban, attitudes toward two other hot-button issues—the Keystone Pipeline and Mexico Border Wall—remained largely unchanged among the panel participants. After a detailed presentation of our results, we provide a series of robustness checks and conclude the manuscript with a brief discussion of the findings and highlight areas for future research.

Theoretical Framework and Argument

Through an extensive analysis of policy preferences over a span of almost forty years, Page and Shapiro (1982) demonstrate that fluctuations in mass opinions are rare. While it may certainly be the case that a substantial segment of the American public lacks sufficient political knowledge and well-developed beliefs on a wide range of public policy issues, this does not mean that "...the public is fickle, confused, or irrational" (p. 39). Indeed, when lacking sufficient information, citizens can and often do rely on cues from those groups and political elites they trust and with whom they share values with (Berinsky 2009; Cohen 2003; Converse 1964; Dawson 2003; Karp 1998; Layman and Carsey 2002; Levendusky 2009; Lupia 1994; Sniderman et al. 1991; Zaller 1992). The perspective that individual opinions are fairly stable is partly grounded in the theory that citizens are psychologically motivated to maintain and support their existing evaluations even in the face of disconfirming information (Redlawsk 2002). This, of course, does not imply that citizens are endlessly engaged in motivated reasoning; experimental evidence suggests that there is a "tipping point" by which citizens will update their evaluations and take new information into account (Redlawsk et al. 2010). Nevertheless, from the opinion stability perspective, rapid and significant fluctuations in opinions should be *unexpected* if one rules out issues of inconsistent survey question-wording and mode effects (Schuman et al. 1981; Tourangeau et al. 2000). And more importantly, in the rare cases that preferences do rapidly change, one can often point to meaningful changes in the political environment as suggested by Page and Shapiro (1982):

> ...Virtually all the rapid shifts we found were related to political and economic circumstances or to significant events which sensible citizens would take into account. In particular, most abrupt foreign policy opinion changes took place in connection with wars, confrontations, or crises in which major changes in the actions of the United States or other nations quite naturally affected preferences about what policies to pursue. (p. 34)

Therefore, government actions or changing circumstances that become politically salient have the capacity to alter citizens' preferences by bringing about new schematic considerations to mind (Zaller 1992). In the case of the "Muslim Ban," we suggest that the information environment (i.e., protests, demonstrations, coverage thereof, media criticism, elite discourse, etc.) rapidly and decisively moved against Trump's executive order in the days after the order was signed. Once news broke that even approved visa holders and legal residents were being detained and barred from entering the United States, thousands of demonstrators gathered outside major airports across the nation. Prominent media outlets, motivated to cover novel and timely events (Graber and Dunaway 2014), aired live broadcasts of the demonstrations and invited pundits to interpret the events as they unfolded. While Donald Trump and representatives of his administration argued that the ban was not specifically targeting Muslims and that it had no religious litmus test, various journalists and media personalities started to refer to the order as a "Muslim Ban." While more left-leaning outlets such the *New York Times* (NYT) delivered particularly searing critiques of the ban, calling it "cowardly," "unrighteous," and "dangerous,"[2] more right-leaning outlets did not provide a particularly favorable image of the ban either. In fact, Fox News' interview with Rudy Giuliani further suggested that the ban was aimed at Muslims in particular, and that President Trump had asked Giuliani to create an order that would "legally work."[3]

In addition to the changing information environment that was promulgated by the demonstrations and controversy at airports, federal judges in New York, Massachusetts, Virginia, and Washington delivered a series of rulings that halted the deportation of valid visa holders. Leading politicians also delivered critical statements against the ban. Senate Minority Leader, Chuck Schumer, for instance, called the ban in a televised press conference as "mean-spirited and un-American." Republicans such as Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, Orrin Hatch, and Rob Portman argued that the ban pits America against one religion and weakens efforts to battle terrorist organizations.[4]

In terms of opposition to the executive order, while the media environment did not redound to what Zaller (1992) refers to as a one-way information flow, empirical evidence suggests that coverage of the ban was intense during the second wave of our data collection (see Fig. 1 below). The information environment was generally skeptical towards the ban and calls to American values increased post executive order. Indeed, as we show in Fig. 2, our systematic analysis of newspaper stories before and after the ban suggests that themes of American identity increased after the executive order announcement (i.e., the ban is "un-American").[5] Thus, in a

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/opinion/donald-trumps-muslim-ban-is-cowardly-and-dangerous.html.

[3] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/30/republicans-insist-this-isnt-a-muslim-ban-trump-and-giuliani-arent-helping-them-make-that-case/?utm_term=.0d6792c46f49.

[4] http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/trump-travel-ban-congress-reaction/index.html.

[5] Our search of newspaper articles include all articles that contain the word "Muslim."



***Note*: The results reveal that ban discussion was highest during wave 2 of data collection. We collected the universe of available broadcast transcripts from Lexis Nexis Academic. From there, we subsetted by a narrow set of search terms identifying the Muslim Ban, including but not limited to: "ban muslim," "muslim ban," "muslims ban," "ban all muslim," "ban some muslim," "travel ban," and "ban travel." The results reflect those CNN, Fox, and MSNBC transcripts that contain mentions of the aforementioned terms.**

Fig. 1 Segments on CNN, Fox, and MSNBC on the "Muslim Ban" pre/post executive order period

shifting information environment where certain identities were primed, it is reasonable to expect some attitudinal change.

Certainly, research on political threat and social movements has demonstrated that nativist government policies and ensuing immigrant demonstrations and media attention can impact racial and ethnic minorities by triggering a sense of group solidarity (Barreto et al. 2009; Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2013), enhancing political efficacy (Wallace et al. 2014), altering policy preferences (Branton et al. 2015), improving the prospect of multi-racial coalition building (Jones-Correa et al. 2016), and politically mobilizing individuals (Barreto and Woods 2005; Cho et al. 2006; Pantoja et al. 2001; Ramakrishnan 2005), even those unlikely actors in unexpected locations (Zepeda-Millán 2016). However, the extent to which a



***Note*: Very little discussion/references were made to Americanness (American values; core values; unamerican, un-american, religious test, violation) before the E.O. announcement, but discussion of this theme more than doubled after the ban. Sources: New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post.**

Fig. 2 Discussions of Muslims and references to concepts/terms related to American identity

changing information environment—partly as a result of mass demonstrations and media criticism—can alter mass attitudes toward nativist policies such as a Muslim ban is still an open question. A recent examination of exit-poll data paints a pessimistic portrait, suggesting that the 2006 immigrant demonstrations and the attention it drew nationally failed to tilt public opinion in favor of Mexican immigrants (Cohen-Marks et al. 2009). While noteworthy, this research does not rely on panel data to assess individual-level shifts before and after the demonstrations, and does not consider how shifts in attitudes can emerge as a result of priming inclusive elements of American identity.

As such, while it is clear that the information environment shifted in the days after the “Muslim Ban” was signed into law, bringing about new considerations to the public’s mind, it remains unclear whether opinions shifted, and if so, amongst whom. Departing from prior work, we demonstrate that a non-random shift *against* the ban occurred in a very short time span, and offer an explanation of this opinion shift by relying on the priming hypothesis framework. Numerous studies have shown that disproportionate weight given to certain aspects of an issue in the information environment (i.e., media) can influence citizens to heavily take those considerations into account when making evaluations (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Krosnick and Brannon 1993; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Miller and Krosnick 2000; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007; Tesler 2015). Emphasis on subtle racial cues or "code words" by the media and campaigns, for example, can activate racial thinking and alter citizens' preferences on subsequent policy and candidate evaluations (Gilens 1996; Jamieson and Waldman 2002; Mendelberg 1997, 2001; Valentino 1999; Valentino et al. 2002). In line with the contention that priming can alter policy preferences, we suggest that the influx of information highlighting the "Muslim Ban" as incompatible with core American values can explain some of the shift against Trump's executive order.

Recent examination of panel data suggests that such opinion shifts can emerge as a result of priming crystallized predispositions (Tesler 2015). Drawing from Sears (1983, 1993) and Krosnick and Petty (1995), Tesler (2015) posits that crystallized predispositions such as social group identities, racial prejudice, and basic American values are stable attitudes—likely acquired through pre-adulthood socialization—that persist through the life cycle and exert considerable influence over new evaluations. In contrast, non-crystallized attitudes are malleable in that they can change due to an influx of new information. By delineating between strongly held predispositions and "weaker attitudes," Tesler (2015) proposes that the former can often be primed by events and mass communication to change preferences on the latter. More specifically, Tesler (2015) demonstrates four cases in which underlying "crystallized" attitudes toward social groups—such as Catholics, gays and lesbians, and blacks—were primed to alter mass evaluations of John F. Kennedy, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, respectively. Our study extends this framework to *policy-specific* evaluations. In particular, we argue that attitudes toward the "Muslim Ban" were not crystallized before the signing of the executive order because the public had not received much information about it at that time. However, an influx of content in the information environment with the signing of the order and ensuing resistance primed inclusive (i.e., egalitarian) elements of American identity and changed attitudes toward the executive order among high American identifiers.

We claim that American identity is an important factor in explaining ban attitude shifts for two reasons: (1) news commentators often raised the point that the ban violated core American values of religious liberty; and (2) demonstration imagery often highlighted protesters shrouded in American flags. The conveyance had the effect of bringing to bear what it means to be American, with a distinct focus on inclusive and welcoming components.

In many ways, the discussion over the "Muslim Ban" centered around who is granted the rights and privileges of being welcome in America and who is not. Crucially—for our purposes—feeling American does not hinge on identification with a specific ideology as Americans of all partisan and ideological persuasions may maintain high or low levels of American identity. American identity is thus non-ideological in nature (Huddy and Khatib 2007). Heightened American identity, however, often manifests in widespread support for restrictive policies targeting an out-group (Citrin et al. 1990; Schildkraut 2003). Prior research has pointed to heightened American identity as an important factor explaining widespread public support for restrictive language and immigration policies (Citrin and Duff 1998; Citrin et al. 1990; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Frendreis and Tatalovich 1997; Schildkraut 2003; Smith 1988). While much of the contemporary xenephobic discourse on immigration is aimed at Latinos (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015), focus on Muslims foreign and domestic has grown exponentially after 9/11. Consequently, Muslims have become increasingly visible and racialized (Calfano et al. 2017; Dana et al. 2011, 2017, 2018; Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018), with numerous, negative, and reductive images of their supposed attitudes and behaviors being transmitted to the public by the media (Haddad 2007; Lajevardi 2017; Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2002, 2007; Said 1978).

Given that high American identifiers are likely to support restrictive immigration policies, and that Muslims have been increasingly demonized in the contemporary information environment and constructed as an out-group (Kalkan et al. 2009; Kam and Kinder 2012; Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018; Oskooii 2016; Sides and Gross 2013), we expect high American identifiers to initially favor the "Muslim Ban" before the E.O. announcement. However, we expect such respondents to reevaluate their attitdues in T2. Challenges to the ban were numerous in the days after the attempted implementation of the executive order as this was the country's first attempt to limit immigration based on religion or national origin since the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act was enacted. As such, the principle of American religious freedom, part of the American consciousness, became salient in the information environment. Media coverage in the days that followed specifically highlighted the ban's incompatibility with American values. CNN commentators on January 29 argued that "a lot of people are worried this is the first step towards a Muslim registry, which, again, would be un-American and unacceptable." The same day, another commentator noted, "But let's be clear... President Trump's executive order is simply un-American." And on January 31 another stated, "citizens exercising their constitutional right to assemble, organize, and have their voices heard is exactly what we expect to see when American values are at stake."

Such critiques of the ban are highly relevant to our claim of opinion change because American identity and religious freedom have been linked since colonial times, when many of America's first colonies explicitly reserved religious freedoms for religious minorities and declared that any infringement would not be tolerated.[6] These colonies were founded on the principle that religious minorities could exercise their faiths along with full benefits of citizenship. This principle was memorialized in the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution upon the founding of the nation. Thus, religious tests in the vein of the "Muslim Ban" are arguably not only unconstitutional, but also distinctly "un-American." Consequently, after the executive order was signed, there was an influx

[6] For example, freedom of religion was explicitly in the founding charters of the following colonies: Maryland (1634), Rhode Island (1636), Connecticut (1636), Flushing, Queens (1645), New Jersey (1682), and Pennsylvania (1682).

of information portraying the "Muslim Ban" at odds with egalitarian principles of American identity, as unconstitutional, and un-American. Given this rapid shift in the information context and given that those with strong American identity are likely to hold sacred this fundamental right of freedom of religion when it is made salient to them, we expect to see a decrease in support for the policy precisely among high American identifiers. Some high American identifiers, then, who might initially opine about the "Muslim Ban" in ways consistent with out-group antipathy, might also be convinced by the religious liberty arguments explicitly conveyed and primed in the information environment post E.O., thereby provoking attitude change.

Hypotheses

In this section, we detail our formal hypotheses, which we then evaluate in the rest of the paper. The most basic hypothesis we test is whether attitudes towards the executive order shifted towards or away from the ban between time/wave 1 (T1) and time/wave 2 (T2). If attitudes towards the ban remain stable between the two periods, our arguments about priming and changes to the information environment are theoretically irrelevant because ban attitudes did not change. On the other hand, if attitude changes are evident, we can further investigate whether the information environment did indeed prime American identity resulting in ban attitude change. The first hypothesis is therefore stated:

H0 Individual attitudes towards the "Muslim Ban" executive order will be no different between T1 and T2.

H1 (Difference) Individual attitudes towards the "Muslim Ban" executive order will be less favorable in T2 than in T1.

The second hypothesis we evaluate is whether respondents high in American identity in T1 are less supportive of the "Muslim Ban" in T2 relative to their support for the "Muslim Ban" in T1. In other words, are high American identifiers less supportive of the ban after Trump's executive order announcement? If high identifiers are less supportive of the ban in T2 than in T1 it provides support for the priming hypothesis given our argument that American identity and its egalitarian components was primed in the ensuing information and media environment.

H0 High American identifiers will be no more or less supportive of the "Muslim Ban" in T2 than in T1.

H2 (Priming) High American identifiers will be less supportive of the "Muslim Ban" in T2 than in T1.

However, there is a possibility that American identity was not primed by the information environment leading to changes in ban attitudes, but rather that people who were initially strongly supportive of the ban became reportedly "more American" in their identification. In other words, if being American means opposing Muslims and supporting travel bans targeted at people from majority-Muslim countries, then initial supporters of the ban should express higher levels of American identity in T2. This finding would compete with Hypothesis 2 (Tesler 2015) and would be consistent with Lenz's account on opinion change (Lenz 2013). While we think this unlikely to be the case given the stability and crystallized nature of American identity, we nonetheless formally test this hypothesis:

H0 Muslim Ban attitudes in T1 will be unrelated to changes in American identity between T1 and T2.

H3 Muslim Ban attitudes in T1 will positively relate to changes in American identity between T1 and T2. T1 respondents most supportive of the "Muslim Ban" will express higher levels of American identity in T2 than in T1.

Data and Methods

To evaluate our hypotheses, and in anticipating the executive order, we fielded a two-wave panel survey of 423 respondents between January 24–27, 2017 (wave 1), before the president announced the executive order. We then fielded a second wave of the same respondents between February 2–8 to assess individual-level change in favor or against the immigration policy. Of the 423 T1 respondents, 311 completed the survey in T2, resulting in a retention rate of 73.5%.[7]

The panel data come from Amazon Mechanical Turk, among U.S. respondents aged 18 and older. Our data are not a representative probability sample allowing us to extrapolate the findings from the sample to the United States adult (18+) population; as one can see from Table 7 in the Appendix, there are some differences with respect to race, age, and education between the M-Turk sample and a representative sample from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES).[8] However, because our design is less focused on external validity and more so on internal validity, we can compare individual shifts from time 1 (T1) to time 2 (T2) to begin assessing causality and to fully evaluate our hypotheses. That said, the immigration policy ("Muslim Ban") opinion shifts observed in our data mirror shifts observed with representative cross-section surveys across a similar time frame.[9] Furthermore, we conducted a robustness check—presented in Tables 16 and 17—which present our analysis but weighted to Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES) 2016 on race, gender, and party proportions, following Huff and Tingley (2015). Fitting with earlier analyses, our core findings remain unchanged (Berinsky et al. 2012).

[7] Given some Don't Know/Refused responses to our ban question in T1 and T2, our main dependent variables in T2 has n = 280 responses. No statistically significant demographic differences emerged across the two waves as a result of response rates (see Table 6 in the Appendix).

[8] Because of this we also analyze our data to weighted CCES proportions; our substantive findings hold.

[9] https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2017/02/07/a-new-poll-shows-a-surprisingly-big-public-swing-against-trumps-muslim-ban/?utm_term=.ba8a426ac235.

The survey asked several questions about President Trump's recent activity, including the following question, which serves as our primary dependent variable: "President Trump's executive order restricting immigration from Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan—do you strongly agree (5), somewhat agree (4), neutral (3), somewhat oppose (2), or strongly oppose this order (1)?" We measure this variable in T1 and T2, running separate regressions for both responses (models 1 and 2). The third model subtracts the answers from T2–T1 to craft the dependent variable, where negative values represent a shift against the ban, and positive values indicate a shift towards the ban. Throughout the discussion of the results, we often refer to this variable as "ban attitude."

To test hypothesis 3, we take the T2–T1 difference in responses to our American identity scale as our dependent variable. We outline this item's measurement in detail below, as it serves as our primary independent variable for the first three models.

Respondents were also presented with two other questions, which serve as dependent variables in a few robustness checks. The questions asked: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following policies that have been or are about to be immediately enacted through executive order by President Donald Trump?"

- (Keystone Pipeline) President Trump's executive order allowing for the Keystone and Dakota Access Pipelines: strongly agree (5), somewhat agree (4), neutral (3), somewhat oppose (2), or strongly oppose (1).
- (Mexico Wall) President Trump's executive order to build a wall on the southern border: strongly agree (5), somewhat agree (4), neutral (3), somewhat oppose (2), or strongly oppose (1).

Our theory of priming assumes that the public was exposed primarily to a media environment focused on the "Muslim Ban" and not on other policies backed by Trump, such as building a wall along the Mexican border or supporting the Keystone Pipeline. It may be possible that respondents shifted ban attitudes not specifically because of new information on the "Muslim Ban" executive order but because respondents moved against Trump and his policies, generally. We find this argument unlikely because attitudes towards Trump between T1 and T2 remain unchanged in our data ($t = 0.512$, p value $= 0.606$). Furthermore, during this time, as Google Analytics data presented in Fig. 3 shows, Americans expressed much more interest in the "Muslim Ban" than these other policy issues.[10] The figure clearly shows that Google searches from Americans concentrated much more heavily around the "Muslim Ban" than the wall or the pipeline. Figure 4 likewise demonstrates that interest on this topic peaked in late January after the executive order announcement.

Nevertheless, as a placebo check, we asked respondents questions about the Keystone Pipeline and the Mexican border wall—both hot-button issues in the news that did not provoke as immediate a public backlash during the same time frame as

[10] Research indicates that Google Analytics is an accurate method to assess what populations are thinking about: https://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/how-racist-are-we-ask-google/.



***Note:* Google trends search over time indicates that the Muslim Ban executive order was more salient during late January and February compared to the executive orders surrounding the border wall and the Keystone Pipeline. The y-axis scale is based on Google Analytics normalizing where 0 is no interest and 100 is the most interest.**

Fig. 3 Google trends search over time

did the seven-nation immigrantion ban. If our theory of priming egalitarian components of American identity is correct, we would expect opinion movement against the immigration ban—and that attitudes towards American identity would be related to such movement—from T1 to T2, but would see no such opinion movement on the Keystone Pipeline (T1 to T2) and the border wall (T1 to T2) because the information environment surrounding these issues was overrun by discussion of the "Muslim Ban." We evaluate this possibility briefly in the results section.

For our initial multivariate panel analysis (testing hypothesis 2), our key independent variable is American identity. This question is an additive scale of four items, with values ranging from 4 to 20. The scale is internally valid, achieving an alpha score of 0.90. If our theory of priming is true, American identity as measured in T1 will predict a movement away from the ban from T1 to T2. The question reads as follows:

> American Identity (additive scale): To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements – strongly disagree (1), somewhat disagree (2),



***Note:* Google trends search over time for different topics associated with the ban all reveal similar trends. The y-axis scale is based on Google Analytics normalizing where 0 is no interest and 100 is the most interest.**

Fig. 4 Google trends search on Muslim Ban/executive order

neither agree nor disagree (3), somewhat agree (4), or strongly agree (5)? The scale runs from 4 (no American identity) to 20 (high American identity):

- My American identity is an important part of myself.
- Being an American is an important part of how I see myself.
- I see myself as a typical American person.
- I am proud to be an American.

Our American identity scale is adopted from a combination of Huddy and Khatib (2007)'s national identity measure and Verkuyten (2005, 2007)'s group identification measure. American identity, then, is a subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the country (Citrin et al. 2001; Huddy 2001, 2015), which previous scholarship has demonstrated to be unrelated to ideology (Citrin et al. 2001; Sidanius et al. 1997; Sniderman et al. 2004).

The variable's distribution, by party, is presented in Fig. 5. Consistent with previous research that American identity is unrelated to self-described liberalism and conservatism, our results demonstrate that while Republicans exhibit a greater share of high identifiers, both Democrats and Independents are spread fairly evenly across the distribution, as is consistent with American identity's theoretical conceptualization.



Note: **The graph reveals a fairly even distribution across party identification, although high American identifiers lean Republican.**

Fig. 5 American identity scale distribution by party identification

In our second multivariate analysis, which allows us to test hypothesis 3, our independent variable is ban attitude measured at T1, and the dependent variable is the change in American identity (wave 2–wave 1). If the direction of the effect runs counter to what we have hypothesized in H2, attitudes on the "Muslim Ban" in T1 will predict a positive change in American identity from T1 to T2.

Finally, we include several control variables in our models to rule out confounders and rival hypotheses (we include several robustness checks using these controls in a post-results section). The control variables and coding details are listed in the Appendix, and include: partisanship (dummy for Democrat and Republican), race (dummy for White), dummy for female, age, income, education, whether the respondent voted for Trump (1 = Yes, 0 = No), Trump approval rating (T1), and a Muslim affect/favorability scale. The Muslim affect scale, developed by Lajevardi (2017) and tested extensively in Lajevardi and Abrajano (2017), consists of nine questions that scale at an alpha of 0.91. The items are included in the Appendix. We employ an ordinary least squares regression approach for evaluation of H2 and H3. This approach allows for consistency of interpretation across all models.[11]

[11] Given the ordinal nature of our immigration ban wording, we do estimate the "Muslim Ban" baseline models (1 and 2) as ordered logit, which we present in Table 9 in the Appendix. Our core findings remain unchanged.

Findings

The first step in assessing our hypotheses (H1) is to determine whether respondents' "Muslim Ban" attitudes changed across the two survey waves. If more people than not shifted towards supporting the ban, then it suggests a mismatch between our theory of priming and how the information environment influenced public opinion. Furthermore, a shift towards the ban or a null effect across interview waves would immediately rule out the need to test H2 and H3.

Given that mass public opinion tends to be stable or only change slowly, a reasonable null expectation is that we should see no statistically discernible and substantively meaningful change on ban attitudes between T1 and T2 (Page and Shapiro 2010). However, there is evidence that exogenous shocks can influence opinion during a relatively short time span (Gartner and Segura 1998; Lee 2002). Given that the publicly available polling data suggests opinion did change on the issue in a relatively short time period, combined with the immediate uproar over the ban, we suspect to see opinion shift against the ban.

Furthermore, given that the two waves were fielded very close in time, the only thing beyond measurement error that should change attitudes is the change in political environment—that is, the executive order announcement, massive demonstrations, and coverage thereof. Measurement error should be random—that is, people supportive, neutral, or against the ban should be equally likely to shift their opinion erroneously—so if attitudinal differences emerge between T1 and T2, the most logical conclusion is that the executive order and coverage of the resulting protests swayed public opinion.

Table 1 demonstrates that overall there was movement against the ban, with 44% of respondents opposing the ban at T1, and 51.4% of the same respondents opposing the ban at T2. A paired-sample difference of means t-test indicates that the estimates are statistically different from one another (Difference = -0.28, $t = -4.66$, $p < 0.001$). These results are clearly supportive of H1.

Clearly, then, public opinion shifted against the ban from T1 to T2. However, Table 1 masks the internal distribution of the variable. People might still support the ban in T2, but not as strongly as they did in T1. Thus, the movement may be greater than what we might see with a 3-point ordinal score. Column 2 in Table 2 shows the internal movement for the ban question. Fifty-seven percent of our respondents did not move at all, whereas upwards of thirty percent moved against the ban, and about ten percent moved towards the ban. This internal movement, then, is consistent with H1.

To strengthen the case that the attitude movement on the ban is due to changes in the information environment leading to new considerations being primed (i.e., egalitarian components of American identity), Table 2 also includes distributions of attitude shifts on the Keystone Pipeline and the Mexico border wall. These two policies were also subject to executive orders around the same time (the Keystone Pipeline E.O. was signed on January 24th; and the Wall with Mexico E.O. was

Table 1 Agree/disagree: President Trump's executive order restricting immigration from Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan

	Time 1	Time 2
Disagree	44.0%	51.4%
N	(181)	(160)
Neutral	13.6%	9.0%
N	(56)	(28)
Agree	42.3%	39.5%
N	(174)	(123)

Table 2 Time 2–Time 1 opinion change on: Immigration 7-country ban; Keystone Pipeline; Build a Wall

T2-T1	Ban change	Ban (n)	Keystone change	Key (n)	Wall change	Wall (n)
− 4	0.00	0	0.00	1	0.00	0
− 3	0.03	7	0.00	1	0.01	3
− 2	0.09	25	0.04	11	0.04	12
− 1	0.20	56	0.10	27	0.12	35
0	0.57	159	0.68	189	0.70	196
1	0.08	23	0.12	34	0.08	22
2	0.02	6	0.04	11	0.03	9
3	0.01	3	0.01	3	0.01	2
4	0.00	1	0.01	2	0.00	1
Diff mean	− 0.28	($p = 0.000$)	0.06	($p = 0.27$)	− 0.06	($p = 0.21$)

signed on January 25th),[12] are highly contentious in their own right, and also featured in the 2016 presidential campaign. If we observe changes on the ban from T1 to T2 but not on these other issues, our argument of a changed information environment specific to the ban is strengthened.

Columns 4 and 6 in Table 2 include the attitude shift distributions on these two executive order items: building the keystone pipeline and building a wall between the U.S. and Mexico. Beyond evaluating our theoretical priors, these two items serve as additional robustness checks against the possibility that respondents in general moved against the Trump agenda. As the results demonstrate, this is not the case. The shift in attitudes for these other two policy areas follows no discernible pattern—it appears to be random. Opinions about building a wall become a bit more negative, but this difference is not substantively or statistically significant (Difference = − 0.064, $t = -1.27$, $p = 0.21$). Opinions about the Keystone pipeline, on the other hand, become a bit more favorable, although, once again, not meaningfully or statistically significant (Difference = 0.061, $t = 1.11$, $p = 0.26$). Finally, we include a table in the Appendix (Table 8), which shows that American

[12] We also subset wave 1 to interviews from the earliest date, January 24, before the announcements of these executive orders. In both cases the difference of means t-test comparisons across waves are not statistically significant.

Table 3 OLS predictors of Muslim Ban attitudes (disagree-agree): President Trump's executive order restricting immigration from Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan

	Dependent variable		
	Ban attitude Wave 1 (1)	Ban attitude Wave 2 (2)	Ban attitude Delta (3)
American identity wave 1	0.057*** (0.014)	0.031* (0.016)	− 0.035* (0.019)
Some college or less	− 0.048 (0.142)	0.014 (0.152)	0.0005 (0.183)
Income less 60K	− 0.084 (0.105)	− 0.050 (0.119)	0.073 (0.144)
Democrat	− 0.150 (0.150)	0.007 (0.175)	0.085 (0.211)
Republican	0.114 (0.158)	0.074 (0.184)	− 0.143 (0.222)
White	− 0.316** (0.139)	0.086 (0.167)	0.566*** (0.201)
Female	− 0.032 (0.101)	− 0.175 (0.115)	− 0.091 (0.139)
Age	0.009** (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	− 0.005 (0.005)
Voted for Trump	1.618*** (0.167)	1.145*** (0.231)	− 0.264 (0.278)
Trump approval wave 1		1.333*** (0.240)	0.801*** (0.289)
Muslim favorability scale	− 0.065*** (0.008)	− 0.041*** (0.010)	0.007 (0.012)
Constant	3.660*** (0.456)	2.372*** (0.540)	− 0.492 (0.650)
Observations	305	205	205
R^2	0.740	0.792	0.102
Adjusted R^2	0.731	0.780	0.050
Residual SE	0.864 (df = 294)	0.808 (df = 193)	0.972 (df = 193)
F statistic	83.706*** (df = 10; 294)	66.935*** (df = 11; 193)	1.986** (df = 11; 193)

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

identity is unrelated to attitude shifts on the Mexico wall and the Keystone pipeline, respectively. Taken together, these findings strongly support H1 in that a non-trivial portion of the respondents were affected by the new and highly salient "Muslim Ban" information environment.

Our second hypothesis evaluates whether the decrease in support for the ban is a result of American identity priming in the information environment. H2 tests whether American identity is associated with a drop in support for the "Muslim Ban" between T1 and T2. The argument is that debates and discussions of the ban as being "un-American," a religious test, and against core American values led some high American identifiers to shift against the ban after the implementation of the executive order produced a new information environment.



Note: **Expected values in panel 1 (top left) based on OLS model simulations controlling for education, income, partisanship, race, gender, age, Trump vote, Trump approval, and Muslim favorability. Predicted change rates in panels 2 (top right) and 3 (bottom left) based on OLS estimates controlling for education, income, partisanship, race, gender, age, Trump vote, and Trump approval.**

Fig. 6 American identity and issues stances on Muslim Ban

Table 3 presents our findings.[13] If the priming theory is correct (H2), then the coefficient for American identity in model 2 should be smaller than the coefficient in model 1, and the coefficient in model 3 should be negative (indicating that American identity in T1 leads to a drop in "ban" support in T2). These expectations all hold in Table 3. We also conducted a wald test, which compares the American identity coefficient from model 2 to the identity coefficient in model 1. The test reveals a statistically significant difference at the 90% confidence level ($F = 2.66$, p value $= 0.10$). While the magnitude of the effect is not significant at the $p < 0.05$ level, we are confident in this result, since it is a small sample, and the effects are clear in the baseline model and in simulated effects.

To further shed light on the aforementioned findings, we also plotted the impact American identity has on ban attitudes, based on post-estimation Monte Carlo simulations. This method simulates expected values of ban attitudes at different levels of American identity while holding all other model variables at their respective means. The top left panel of Fig. 6 shows that respondents who exhibited

[13] For sample size purposes, we dummy education and income. We present models in the Appendix where we treat these variables in their more continuous format. See Tables 14 and 15. Our findings remain unchanged. The overall sample size for the change models drop, too, on account of some missing data throughout the dataset. We also conducted a hot deck imputation on the missing data and re-estimated the analysis; our substantive findings did not change.

Table 4 OLS predictors of American identity shift as function of ban attitudes—DV: scale of American identity items (delta)

	Dependent variable American identity Delta
Muslim Ban attitudes wave 1	− 0.221 (0.202)
Some college or less	0.470 (0.436)
Income less 60K	− 0.210 (0.341)
Democrat	− 0.027 (0.500)
Republican	0.712 (0.530)
White	− 0.441 (0.488)
Female	− 0.103 (0.328)
Age	0.024* (0.013)
Voted for Trump	0.285 (0.725)
Trump approval wave 1	0.278 (0.698)
Muslim favorability scale	− 0.040 (0.029)
Constant	0.680 (1.575)
Observations	205
R^2	0.082
Adjusted R^2	0.030
Residual SE	2.314 (df = 193)
F statistic	1.569 (df = 11; 193)

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

high levels of American identity as measured in T1 scored over 3.3 on the 5 point "Muslim Ban" immigration policy question. This is akin to lukewarm support of the ban. The same respondents in T2, however, scored about 2.8 points on the 5 point scale, which is akin to lukewarm opposition to the ban. The plot also reveals no difference on ban support from T1 to T2 among low American identifiers. The top right panel of the same figure demonstrates the expected shift in support for the "Muslim Ban" as a function of T1 American identity. Clearly, high identifiers shifted against the ban, whereas low identifiers remained unchanged across the two measurement periods. These findings provide strong support for H2.

Finally, we evaluated the possibility that opinion change occurred on American identity as a function of attitude change on the "Muslim Ban" (H3). That is, respondents high in ban support in wave 1 instead altered their predisposition of American identity in wave 2. If H3 is supported then we should expect a positive coefficient, as the theoretical argument in this context is that opposing Muslims would make one identify more strongly as an American. Table 4 presents the model results. The "Muslim Ban" coefficient is actually negative but not statistically significant. Further, using the same simulation approach as above, the bottom left panel in Fig. 6 reveals that the expected American identity shift from T1 to T2 is not a function of "Muslim Ban" attitudes measured in T1. Both of these findings fail to support H3; as the null hypothesis is not rejected.

To assess the distinct role of American identity, we included several control variables that we anticipated might co-vary with attitudes on the ban. Some of these variables are statistically significant in the various analyses, whereas others are not. Party identification is not statistically significant in any of our analyses, primarily because "Voted for Trump" or "Trump approval T1" are statistically predictive of supporting the ban, capturing the influence that party might normally have.

Age is a statistically significant predictor of pro-ban attitudes in Wave 1 (Table 3, Column 1), and is also the only statistically significant predictor of American identity change (Table 4). Older voters, compared to younger voters, tend to have less racially diverse experiences. Therefore, it is not entirely surprising that such voters were initially more supportive of the ban. The second finding predicting American identity change, however, is less clear. This model's explanatory power is also weak (adjusted $R^2 = 0.03$). Thus, we are hesitant to draw any conclusions about the impact of age on identity change.

Relative to non-whites, whites in wave 1 appear to be less supportive of the ban (Table 3, Column 1). However, this is largely a result of the model's other variables, as the bivariate correlation between white and immigration ban opinion is 0.09, indicating that whites had a slightly higher preference for the ban policy than non-whites—not taking other variables into account. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 3 show that whites became more supportive of the ban from T1 to T2. Thus, all else equal, relative to non-whites, whites moved from slightly less favorable on the ban to more favorable on the ban after the ensuing protests and media controversy. Finally, respondents with more favorable opinions of Muslims (as denoted on the Muslim favorability scale) were less supportive of the ban in both wave 1 and wave 2. This is in line with expectations, because if one's opinion of this group is high (positive), one should be less likely to support measures abridging Muslims' equal treatment.

In sum, the results support both hypotheses 1 and 2, but reject hypothesis 3. These findings provide broad support for the argument that the information environment primed components of American identity, which resulted in shifts against the ban—at least for some respondents.

Robustness Checks

In this section we evaluate several robustness checks, which examine potential validity threats to our analysis. All of the results are included in the Appendix.

We have shown that the general U.S. public was focused on the "Muslim Ban" relative to other executive orders, and that the media was intensely focused on the executive order ban during the second wave of our survey, leading to a clear agenda setting effect (McCombs 2014; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Wanta et al. 2004). However, to further ensure that our respondents were indeed exposed to a "new" media environment, we asked the following question near the end of our survey in wave 2: "Have you engaged in any of the following activities since last Friday (January 27, 2017): Watched demonstrations and protests on television or the internet against the immigration ban."

We subset our data to the 79% of wave 2 respondents who answered in the affirmative to the above question. While we cannot rule out selection effects (i.e., there might be something unique about people who watched news coverage of the demonstrations), we did check to ensure that the sample is balanced on key variables across respondents who said they saw demonstrations on television versus those who said they did not. Table 10 in the Appendix reveals no statistically discernible differences on these relevant variables across the split, with the exception of age. Tables 11 and 12 in the Appendix re-estimate our main models only among respondents who reported seeing demonstrations on the internet or on the television. Our main results remain unchanged.

Another potential issue is that some of our models include Trump approval and Trump vote, and perhaps this invokes multi-collinearity into our estimates for the "Muslim Ban" wave 2 model. The variance inflation scores for the two Trump variables are 4.098 (vote Trump) and 4.517 (Trump approval), which fall within acceptable scores (Craney and Surles 2002). However, to be sure, we re-estimated the "Muslim Ban" wave 2 model without Trump Approval T1 as shown in Table 13 (see Appendix). Our substantive results remain unchanged.[14]

Finally, part of our theoretical argument is that the "new" information environment generated new considerations about American identity, such that high American identifiers brought these new considerations to bear and shifted their opinions on the "Muslim Ban." Our American identity survey items do not include measures of egalitarianism. Thus, this part of our theory is assumed rather than tested. That said, although we do not have a measure of ideology, we might anticipate that Democrats are, in general, more egalitarian than Republicans given the current and historical makeup of party elites and mass members (Fogel 2000; McCarty et al. 2016; Poole and Rosenthal 1984). Furthermore, it is usually the case that the Democratic Party is responsible for what Sidanius and Pratto (2001) call "hierarchy attenuating social legislation" like New Deal policies, Great Society legislation, and Affordable Care Act.

At the very end of our wave 2 survey, we did ask respondents the following open-ended item, which was specific to the demonstrations that erupted after the executive order announcement: "Did the recent demonstrations and public statements against the recent immigration and visa ban impact your views toward immigration policy?" High American-identifying Democrats elicited responses consistent with an inclusive egalitarian outlook:

- "I've already held the view that know [sic] one should be banned from entering this melting pot of a country based on religion."
- "My views toward immigration policy were not contingent on how protesters felt. I've always consider America to be open and welcoming, and this ban runs directly counter to that."
- "We are a land of immigrants. We should learn from our own history and stop repeating the same mistakes. Send me your huddled masses."

[14] Also see Tables 14, 15, 16, 17 in the Appendix for additional analyses.

- "Ban visa will harm more people than it appears and a lot of innocents gonna suffer for nothing."
- "My views are already consistent with that of most Americans, which is let people come here and live the American dream, as they've always been able to."

We also investigated this question more quantitatively, by estimating a $k = 5$ topic model, using the *topicmodels* package in R (Hornik and Grün 2011). The model produced the five topics listed in Table 5 (see Appendix), then assigned each response topic that scored the highest probability. Under this guise, interpretation is not always entirely forthcoming, but a relatively clear "inclusive/empathy" topic emerges in topic 4. Terms like "America," "welcome," "legal," "help," and "other" comprise this topic. Moreover, a clear partisan separation emerged specifically on this item: 23 percent of Democrats gave this empathy response compared to just 13 percent of Republicans. Republicans, however, were more likely to give a topic 5 answer (22% Republicans vs. 7% Democrats), indicating the respondent was less likely to change their mind. These findings are also statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 13.9$, $p < 0.10$).

Furthermore, we might expect that high American identifying Democrats will respond more forcefully against the ban precisely because the egalitarian components of their American identity were activated. To evaluate this quantitatively, we subset the data to respondents who score 19 or 20 on the American identity scale in T1 (high identifiers). Table 18 reveals that high American-identifying Democrats are much more likely to move against the ban than are Independents and Republicans. Moreover, a three-way ANOVA indicates these differences are statistically significant ($F = 3.4$, p value < 0.10). These findings are consistent with our overall theoretical expectations and support our argument that the "new" information environment stimulated new considerations of egalitarianism among some high-American identifiers who then shifted against the ban.[15]

Conclusion

Throughout the 2016 presidential campaign Republican-nominee Donald Trump ran on a platform of banning Muslim immigration to the United States. In March 2016, a YouGov poll found that 51% of all Americans agreed that there should be "a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country's representatives can figure out what is going on."[16] One week after inauguration, President Trump enacted the "Muslim Ban" through executive action. While public opinion about the ban was relatively supportive in the months, weeks, and days before the signing of the executive order, cross-sectional polls hinted that public opinion had rapidly shifted once the executive order was signed.

[15] This finding speaks to affective polarization and the interactive relationship between partisanship and the non-ideological construct of American identity. Although we note that we interacted the two, due to sample size limitations, we did not find a statistically significant effect. Future research with larger sample sizes should further examine this relationship.

[16] https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/aipb1h7oe9/tabs_Religious_Discrimination_20160325.pdf.

The present study provides an explanation for why and amongst whom attitudes shifted against the ban. By implementing a unique panel design where we surveyed the exact same respondents just before the travel ban announcement and just days after the initial airport protests, we found that individual-level support for the ban shifted dramatically, particularly among those strong American identifiers. In the hours and days after the executive order was signed we also demonstrated that the information environment—which overwhelmingly focused on the ban above other news events and executive orders—painted the ban, to some degree, as inherently un-American. Challenges to the ban were numerous, with protesters, media commentators, and elites repeatedly and openly critiquing it as fundamentally incompatible with core American values.

Given this rapid shift in the information context, we found a decrease in support for the policy precisely among high American identifiers. Some high American identifiers, then, who might have initially shown support toward the "Muslim Ban" in ways consistent with out-group antipathy (Mummendey et al. 2001; Sidanius and Pratto 2001), may have been convinced by the arguments explicitly conveyed and primed in the information environment post E.O., thereby provoking attitude change. While we found clear and convincing evidence that high American identifiers shifted against the ban across the two measurement periods, future research would benefit from an investigation of whether this attitude change will remain constant or whether it will regress back to the baseline once discussions of it fades away. As it stands, "Muslim Ban 3.0" is being challenged in the courts and will provide another unique opportunity to test the long-term effects of the attitude change we observed. Furthermore, future research should investigate how different out-groups can employ themes of American identity vis-á-vis protest to sway opinion towards inclusive policy positions.

In assessing support for the "Muslim Ban" in the days before its implementation and in the days after protests swept the country, our findings contribute to existing scholarship in two distinct ways. First, we provide evidence of rapid, non-random individual-level opinion shifts as a function of the information environment priming crystallized predispositions. This suggests that public opinion can shift much more quickly than previously noted in the literature (Broockman and Kalla 2016; Page and Shapiro 1982, 2010), and that American identity can be primed to generate opposition, rather than support, for restrictive immigration-related policies. Second, our study highlights the potential broad political effects of mass movements and protests, engaging scholarly research related to how demonstrations can play a meaningful role in bringing about new considerations in the information environment and potentially generating opinion change among mass publics (Lee 2002; Zepeda-Millán 2017). The scholarly work in this area is still relatively small and burgeoning, but, given our research design, scholars can increasingly begin to examine how real-world events affect individuals' policy positions and political attitudes.

Our research speaks to the protest and social-movements literature, but also public opinion literature as a whole. How do actual events—and their framing—shift public opinion? To be sure, the literature is full of experiments and analyses on this topic. However, relatively limited research looks at how real-world events may shift individual-level opinions so quickly. Even though Muslims are a group, and we know that public opinion of groups tends to be more stable (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992), attitudes still shifted in a more favorable direction as a function of protests and how the policy under question was covered in the information environment. Beyond demographic and long-standing values-oriented variables (i.e., ideology and party identification), our work speaks to the possibility that public opinion on a variety of topics may be undergoing constant shifts as issues move in and out of the news cycle. Some of these news events are short and do not affect opinion in the near-term nor in the long-term, whereas other events affect opinion in the short-term but then people move back to their standing positions after the issue has left the news cycle. However, some issues emerge as a flash-point controversy, then periodically reassert themselves into the news cycle. In this case, each time the issue emerges into the news cycle, opinions that had formed or shifted as a result of the "initial event" (i.e., airport protests), may be reconfirmed. Future research should use similar panel designs to investigate why different events result in long-standing attitudinal shifts. Is there a typology of events that might be used to explain why public opinion does not shift, shifts then regresses to the mean, and then shifts long-term? Existing scholarship speaks to this somewhat, but researchers may consider employing long-running panel designs to help answer these types of questions. While we have learned a lot with cross-sectional designs, short, flash-point panel analyses may better capture how real-world events influence public opinion.

Before we conclude, we would be remiss not to mention that this administration's travel ban is one of the more disturbing executive actions of the modern presidency, one that calls into question fundamental tenets of religious freedom and poses a serious threat to the rights and protections of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. What is perhaps more troubling is that the administration, despite numerous setbacks, has attempted to implement new versions of the ban that could potentially skirt legal scrutiny by federal courts. Thus, while the ban has faced widespread media and elite criticism and public opinion shifted against it, the administration has not shown any signs of changing course. If anything, President Trump has doubled down and continues to cater to his base of supporters who welcome nativist policies such as the "Muslim Ban" even if it means violating core American values and civil liberties (Davis 2007; Davis and Silver 2004; McClosky and Brill 1993). It remains to be seen whether these ostensible violations of civil liberties will negatively affect Trump and other Republicans in upcoming elections.

Appendix

Control variables:

- DV: President Trump's executive order restricting immigration from Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan. Strongly disagree (1); Somewhat disagree (2); Neither agree nor disagree (3); Somewhat agree (4); Strongly agree (5).
- President Trump's executive order allowing for the Keystone and Dakota Access Pipelines. (1); Somewhat disagree (2); Neither agree nor disagree (3); Somewhat agree (4); Strongly agree (5).

- President Trump's executive order to build a wall on the southern border. (1); Somewhat disagree (2); Neither agree nor disagree (3); Somewhat agree (4); Strongly agree (5).
- Income: What is your family's annual income? Under $20,000 a year (1); Between $20,000 and $40,000 a year (2); Between $40,000 and $60,000 a year (3) Between $60,000 and $80,000 a year (4) Between $80,000 and $120,000 a year (5); Over $120,000 a year (6). $60K or less = 1; else = 0.
- Education: What is the highest level of education you have completed? No High School Degree (1); High School Degree (2); Some College; (3) 2-Year College Degree (4) 4-Year College Degree (5); Post Graduate Degree (6). Some College or less = 1; else = 0.
- Which political party do you most align with? (1 = Democrat; else = 0; 1 = Republican; else = 0; Independent/other = base category)
- American Identity (additive scale): To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements—strongly disagree (1), somewhat disagree (2), neither agree nor disagree (3), somewhat agree (4), or strongly agree (5)? The scale runs from 4 (no American identity) to 20 (high American identity):
  - My American identity is an important part of myself.
  - Being an American is an important part of how I see myself.
  - I see myself as a typical American person.
  - I am proud to be an American.

- Muslim Affect Scale: With respect to Muslim Americans, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements—strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, strongly agree? (statements (re)coded so that high values indicate positive affect)
  - Muslim Americans integrate successfully into American culture.
  - Muslim Americans sometimes do not have the best interests of Americans at heart.
  - Muslims living in the US should be subject to more surveillance than others.
  - Muslim Americans, in general, tend to be more violent than other people.
  - Most Muslim Americans reject jihad and violence.
  - Most Muslim Americans lack basic English language skills.
  - Most Muslim Americans are not terrorists.
  - Wearing headscarves should be banned in all public places.
  - Muslim Americans do a good job of speaking out against Islamic terrorism.

- Age: In what year were you born (2016-answer)
- Female: What is your gender? Male (0) or Female (1)
- White: What racial group best describes you? White (1) else = 0.
- Voted Trump?: Did you vote in the 2016 presidential election? Yes, I voted for Hillary Clinton (0); Yes, I voted for Donald Trump (1); Yes, I voted for a third party (0); No, I did not vote. (0)

- Do you approve of the way President Trump's is handling his job as President? 1 = Approve; Else = 0.

See Appendix Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18

Table 5 Did the recent demonstrations and public statements against the recent immigration and visa ban impact your views toward immigration policy?

Word	Topic (1) (62)	Topic (2) (69)	Topic (3) (55)	Topic (4) (52)	Topic (5) (39)
1	Immigr	Ban	Polici	Immigr	Chang
2	Demonstr	Immigr	Protest	Protest	Protest
3	Chang	Countri	Chang	Ban	Demonstr
4	Polici	Come	Immigr	Polici	Protestor
5	Protest	American	Opinion	America	Right
6	Opinion	Chang	Demonstr	Chang	Opinion
7	Ban	Place	Trump	Refuge	Fact
8	Countri	Wrong	Countri	Countri	Issu
9	Impact	Vet	Statement	Demonstr	Noth
10	Support	Noth	Presid	Welcom	Ban
11	Agre	First	Agre	Legal	Mind
12	Anyth	Time	Alway	Alway	Polici
13	Trump	Trump	Order	Order	Take
14	Realli	Presid	Problem	Oppos	Side
15	Someth	Good	Sinc	Help	Point
16	Know	Process	Action	Other	Countri
17	Mind	Back	Act	Take	Thing
18	Allow	Polici	Public	Execut	Remain
19	Thought	Citizen	Media	Still	Liber
20	Dont	America	Now	Thought	Pro-immigr

K = 5 topic model, using LDA classifier

Table 6 Wave 1 and wave 2 difference of means comparisons

	W1_mean	W2_mean	T_stat	p_value
White	0.82	0.80	0.63	0.53
Female	0.47	0.45	0.52	0.60
Age	38.73	46.32	− 1.23	0.22
Income	3.11	3.24	− 1.15	0.25
Education	2.61	2.71	− 1.46	0.14
Vote Trump	0.43	0.45	− 0.32	0.75
Party ID	1.93	1.97	− 0.50	0.62
Keystone	2.56	2.61	− 0.42	0.68
Wall	2.65	2.59	0.44	0.66
Muslim Ban	2.97	2.71	2.10	0.04

Table 7 Unweighted MTurk and CCES data (voters)

	MTurk (%)	CCES (%)	Delta
Gender			
Male	54.14	48.00	− 6.14
Female	45.86	52.00	6.14
Party			
Rep	30.19	32.00	1.81
Ind	26.87	33.00	6.13
Dem	42.94	35.00	− 7.94
Race			
Non-white	15.75	28.00	12.25
White	84.25	72.00	− 12.25
Education			
College plus	16.85	26.00	9.15
Some college or less	83.15	74.00	− 9.15
Age			
18–35	46.69	31.00	− 15.69
36–50	31.49	23.00	− 8.49
51+	21.82	46.00	24.18

Table 8 OLS predictors of Mexico Wall and Keystone Pipeline T1–T2 change attitudes (disagree–agree): (1) President Trump's executive order to build a wall on the southern border. (2) President Trump's executive order allowing for the Keystone and Dakota Access Pipelines

	Dependent variable	
	Wall attitude Delta (1)	Keystone attitude Delta (2)
American identity wave 1	− 0.008 (0.014)	− 0.012 (0.017)
Some college or less	0.077 (0.134)	− 0.186 (0.166)
Income less 60K	0.027 (0.105)	− 0.021 (0.131)
Democrat	− 0.079 (0.154)	− 0.015 (0.191)
Republican	− 0.010 (0.162)	0.447** (0.201)
White	0.101 (0.146)	0.058 (0.182)
Female	0.058 (0.101)	0.140 (0.126)
Age	− 0.003 (0.004)	− 0.002 (0.005)
Voted for Trump	− 0.291 (0.203)	0.124 (0.252)
Trump approval wave 1	0.334 (0.211)	− 0.358 (0.262)
Muslim favorability scale	0.009 (0.008)	− 0.008 (0.010)
Constant	− 0.276 (0.474)	0.559 (0.589)
Observations	205	204
R^2	0.032	0.058
Adjusted R^2	− 0.024	0.004
Residual SE	0.709 (df = 193)	0.880 (df = 192)
F statistic	0.571 (df = 11; 193)	1.078 (df = 11; 192)

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9 Ordered logistic predictors of Muslim Ban attitudes (disagree-agree): President Trump's executive order restricting immigration from Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan

	Dependent variable	
	Ban attitude Wave 1 (1)	Ban attitude Wave 2 (2)
American identity wave 1	0.172*** (0.039)	0.112*** (0.053)
Some college or less	0.019 (0.351)	0.111 (0.445)
Income less 60K	− 0.090 (0.265)	− 0.137 (0.341)
Democrat	− 0.152 (0.374)	− 0.066 (0.506)
Republican	0.577 (0.410)	0.305 (0.473)
White	− 0.672* (0.345)	0.262 (0.513)
Female	− 0.148 (0.261)	− 0.641* (0.338)
Age	0.023** (0.010)	0.023* (0.013)
Voted for Trump	2.840*** (0.429)	1.945*** (0.566)
Trump approval wave 1		2.011*** (0.645)
Muslim favorability scale	− 0.194*** (0.024)	− 0.140*** (0.030)
Constant	− 4.621*** (1.271)	− 1.524 (1.649)
2|3	− 3.136** (1.242)	− 0.337 (1.639)
3|4	− 1.806 (1.229)	0.513 (1.648)
4|5	− 0.236 (1.237)	2.587 (1.680)
Observations	305	205
Pseudo R^2	0.570	0.642
llh null	− 633.196	− 454.992
llh	− 272.038	− 162.699

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 10 Demographic difference of mean comparisons across respondents who saw demonstrations on TV versus those who did not

	No_demonstrations	See_demonstrations	T_stat	p_value
White	0.78	0.83	− 0.80	0.43
Female	0.40	0.47	− 0.89	0.37
Age	43.29	39.10	1.91	0.06
Income	0.58	0.50	1.09	0.28
Education	0.75	0.72	0.41	0.68
Vote Trump	0.42	0.42	0.02	0.99
Party ID	2.16	2.11	0.48	0.64
Refugee Ban	3.05	2.96	0.39	0.70
American identity	14.55	15.27	− 1.10	0.28

Table 11 OLS predictors of Muslim Ban attitudes (disagree-agree): President Trump's executive order restricting immigration from Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan

	Dependent variable		
	Ban attitude Wave 1 (1)	Ban attitude Wave 1 (2)	Ban attitude Delta (3)
American identity wave 1	0.066*** (0.017)	0.023 (0.016)	− 0.041* (0.021)
Some college or less	0.063 (0.159)	0.074 (0.148)	− 0.027 (0.194)
Income less 60K	− 0.135 (0.126)	− 0.088 (0.116)	0.050 (0.152)
Democrat	− 0.164 (0.185)	− 0.061 (0.173)	0.052 (0.225)
Republican	0.408** (0.193)	− 0.098 (0.181)	− 0.446* (0.237)
White	− 0.401** (0.197)	− 0.151 (0.183)	0.293 (0.239)
Female	− 0.078 (0.125)	− 0.319*** (0.116)	− 0.235 (0.151)
Age	0.010* (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	− 0.002 (0.006)
Voted for Trump	1.605*** (0.209)	1.242*** (0.230)	− 0.113 (0.300)
Trump approval wave 1		1.284*** (0.239)	0.806** (0.312)
Muslim favorability scale	− 0.052*** (0.010)	− 0.047*** (0.010)	− 0.001 (0.012)
Constant	2.966*** (0.572)	2.853*** (0.547)	0.171 (0.715)
Observations	166	166	166
R^2	0.788	0.836	0.117
Adjusted R^2	0.774	0.824	0.054
Residual SE	0.776 (df = 155)	0.717 (df = 154)	0.936 (df = 154)
F statistic	57.637*** (df = 10; 155)	71.249*** (df = 11; 154)	1.861** (df = 11; 154)

Disagree–agree. Subset to respondents who saw coverage of demonstrations

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 12 Predictors of American identity shift as function of ban attitudes—DV: scale of American identity items

	Dependent variable American identity Delta
Muslim Ban attitudes wave 1	− 0.256 (0.245)
Some cllege or lss	0.691 (0.506)
Income less 60K	− 0.256 (0.395)
Democrat	0.265 (0.588)
Republican	1.069* (0.623)
White	− 0.617 (0.635)
Female	− 0.271 (0.392)
Age	0.045*** (0.017)
Voted for Trump	0.166 (0.854)

Table 12 continued

	Dependent variable American identity Delta
Trump aproval wave 1	0.639 (0.822)
Muslim favorability scale	− 0.027 (0.034)
Constant	− 0.673 (1.861)
Observations	166
R^2	0.118
Adjusted R^2	0.055
Residual SE	2.440 (df = 154)
F statistic	1.869** (df = 11; 154)

Subset to respondents who saw coverage of demonstrations

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 13 OLS predictors of Muslim Ban attitudes (disagree-agree): President Trump's executive order restricting immigration from Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan

	Dependent variable Ban attitude Wave 2
American identity wave 1	0.034** (0.017)
Some college or less	− 0.048 (0.163)
Income less 60K	− 0.025 (0.128)
Democrat	− 0.215 (0.183)
Republican	0.232 (0.195)
White	0.129 (0.179)
Female	− 0.164 (0.124)
Age	0.007 (0.005)
Voted for Trump	1.831*** (0.210)
Muslim favorability scale	− 0.057*** (0.010)
Constant	3.119*** (0.562)
Observations	205
R^2	0.759
Adjusted R^2	0.747
Residual SE	0.867 (df = 194)
F statistic	61.176*** (df = 10; 194)

Disagree–agree. Wave 1 Trump approval omitted

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 14 OLS predictors of Muslim Ban attitudes (disagree-agree): President Trump's executive order restricting immigration from Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan

	Dependent variable		
	Ban attitude Wave 1 (1)	Ban attitude Wave 2 (2)	Ban attitude Delta (3)
American identity wave 1	0.057*** (0.014)	0.032** (0.016)	− 0.034* (0.019)
Education (low–high)	− 0.025 (0.068)	− 0.032 (0.078)	0.003 (0.094)
Income (low–high)	0.010 (0.038)	− 0.002 (0.042)	− 0.024 (0.051)
Democrat	− 0.138 (0.151)	0.015 (0.175)	0.079 (0.210)
Republican	0.135 (0.159)	0.092 (0.185)	− 0.140 (0.223)
White	− 0.309** (0.140)	0.091 (0.167)	0.569*** (0.201)
Female	− 0.036 (0.101)	− 0.178 (0.115)	− 0.090 (0.138)
Age	0.009** (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	− 0.005 (0.005)
Voted for Trump	1.617*** (0.167)	1.141*** (0.231)	− 0.270 (0.278)
Trump approval wave 1		1.331*** (0.240)	0.803*** (0.288)
Muslim favorability scale	− 0.064*** (0.008)	− 0.040*** (0.010)	0.007 (0.011)
Constant	3.547*** (0.431)	2.388*** (0.511)	− 0.377 (0.614)
Observations	304	205	205
R^2	0.738	0.792	0.102
Adjusted R^2	0.729	0.781	0.050
Residual SE	0.866 (df = 293)	0.808 (df = 193)	0.972 (df = 193)
F statistic	82.688*** (df = 10; 293)	66.951*** (df = 11; 193)	1.984** (df = 11; 193)

Disagree–agree. Education and income continuous

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 15 OLS predictors of American identity shift as function of ban attitudes–DV: scale of American identity items

	Dependent variable American identity Delta
Muslim Ban attitudes wave 1	− 0.218 (0.201)
Education (low–high)	− 0.288 (0.223)
Income (low–high)	0.045 (0.120)
Democrat	0.025 (0.498)
Republican	0.763 (0.532)
White	− 0.446 (0.488)
Female	− 0.094 (0.327)
Age	0.024* (0.013)
Voted for Trump	0.281 (0.724)

Table 15 continued

	Dependent variable American identity Delta
Trump approval wave 1	0.240 (0.695)
Muslim favorability scale	− 0.038 (0.029)
Constant	1.537 (1.493)
Observations	205
R^2	0.084
Adjusted R^2	0.032
Residual SE	2.312 (df = 193)
F statistic	1.607* (df = 11; 193)

Education and income continuous

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table 16 GLM predictors of Muslim Ban attitudes (disagree-agree): President Trump's executive order restricting immigration from Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan

	Dependent variable		
	Ban attitude Wave 1 (1)	Ban attitude Wave 2 (2)	Ban attitude Delta (3)
American identity wave 1	0.059*** (0.013)	0.036* (0.019)	− 0.036* (0.021)
Some college or l	− 0.199 (0.164)	− 0.088 (0.182)	0.024 (0.167)
Income less 60K	− 0.082 (0.108)	0.001 (0.139)	0.148 (0.168)
Democrat	− 0.103 (0.162)	0.072 (0.171)	0.109 (0.210)
Republican	0.261 (0.188)	0.161 (0.210)	− 0.250 (0.316)
White	− 0.278* (0.162)	0.118 (0.201)	0.551** (0.256)
Female	− 0.074 (0.126)	− 0.182 (0.130)	− 0.028 (0.173)
Age	0.011*** (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	− 0.007 (0.007)
Voted for Trump	1.502*** (0.219)	1.139*** (0.341)	− 0.111 (0.376)
Trump approval wave 1		1.248*** (0.353)	0.808** (0.373)
Muslim favorability scale	− 0.062*** (0.008)	− 0.042*** (0.010)	0.008 (0.013)
Constant	3.524*** (0.540)	2.307*** (0.656)	− 0.535 (0.816)
Observations	305	205	205
Log likelihood	− 400.542	− 253.050	− 294.777
Akaike inf. crit.	823.085	530.100	613.553

Disagree–agree. Weighted to race, gender, and party CCES proportions

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table 17 GLM predictors of American identity shift as function of ban attitudes—DV: scale of American identity items

	Dependent variable American identity Delta
Muslim Ban attitudes wave 1	− 0.252 (0.235)
Some college or less	0.309 (0.388)
Income less 60K	− 0.229 (0.372)
Democrat	− 0.170 (0.328)
Republican	0.572 (0.535)
White	− 0.586 (0.412)
Female	− 0.169 (0.357)
Age	0.025 (0.022)
Voted for Trump	0.161 (0.707)
Trump approval wave 1	0.371 (0.551)
Muslim favorability scale	− 0.054 (0.043)
Constant	1.622 (2.435)
Observations	205
Log likelihood	− 469.834
Akaike inf. crit.	963.668

Weighted to race, gender, and party CCES proportions

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table 18 Mean party differences on ban change among high identifiers

Party	Mean Ban shift	N	SD
Republican	− 0.39	33	1.06
Independent	− 0.47	19	1.12
Democrat	− 1.00	19	1.11
Total	− 0.58	71	1.10

Democrats shift more against the ban, followed by independents, then republicans

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